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Abstract
Advances in genomics have led to calls for developing population-based preventive genomic 
sequencing (PGS) programs with the goal of identifying genetic health risks in adults without 
known risk factors. One critical issue for minimizing the harms and maximizing the benefits of 
PGS is determining the kind and degree of control individuals should have over the generation, 
use, and handling of their genomic information. In this article we examine whether PGS programs 
should offer individuals the opportunity to selectively opt-out of the sequencing or analysis of 
specific genomic conditions (the menu approach) or whether PGS should be implemented using an 
all-or-nothing panel approach. We conclude that any responsible scale up of PGS will require a 
menu approach that may seem impractical to some, but which draws its justification from a rich 
mix of normative, legal, and practical considerations.
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Introduction
The decreasing cost of massively parallel DNA-sequencing technologies and an increasing 
understanding of the genomic basis of certain medical conditions has spurred enthusiasm for 
Preventive Genomic Sequencing (PGS) programs designed to help identify “those millions 
of individuals who unknowingly carry mutations that confer a dramatic predisposition to 
preventable diseases” (Evans et al. 2013, 332). Unlike previous population-based genetic 
screening programs, PGS programs would not be aimed at known high-risk groups or 
families, but would go “looking for trouble” in the general population, to attempt to forestall 
unsuspected cases of genetic illness. The prospect of such programs raises numerous ethical, 
legal, and medical questions that have yet to be answered in evidence-based ways, including 
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which loci to sequence, who PGS programs should target, and how they should be designed 
and implemented. Connecting all these concerns is a common challenge: how to manage the 
trouble that a PGS program could potentially generate for both patients and clinicians in the 
process of pursuing its goals. One critical tension animating that challenge is determining 
the relative roles that patients' informed preferences and clinicians' judgments should play in 
decisions about how to manage genomic information.
In this article, we analyze this tension from the perspectives of public health, economics and 
technology, clinical ethics, family studies, health law, and our ongoing immersion in an 
attempt to build one such PGS program in practice (GeneScreen 2014). Specifically, the 
purpose of this article is to help generate a debate that can guide policy regarding whether 
PGS programs should offer individuals the opportunity to selectively opt-out of the 
sequencing or analysis of specific genomic conditions (the menu approach) or whether PGS 
should be implemented using an all-or-nothing panel approach. We argue that any 
responsible scale up of PGS as a clinically-based health tool will require a menu approach 
that may seem impractical to some, but which draws its justification from a rich mix of 
normative, legal, and practical considerations that go beyond the appeals to respect for 
patient autonomy that typically undergird concern for patient choice.
The idea of PGS itself is in large part stimulated by the increasing use of clinical whole 
genome/whole exome sequencing (WGS/WES) to help resolve diagnostic mysteries or 
choose between therapeutic regimes. One problematic aspect of WGS/WES has been that it 
generates “incidental findings on a larger scale than has previously been seen in medicine”
(Foreman et al. 2013, 503; Kohane et al. 2005). Some of these incidental findings will be 
alleles of genes that reveal high risks for serious, previously unsuspected, but potentially 
preventable harms (Berg et al. 2013). The American College of Medical Genetics and 
Genomics (ACMG) refers to the genes that can display such risk-conferring alleles as 
medically actionable genes1 (MAGs) (ACMG 2014). Genes are generally considered 
medically actionable when some of their variants “have direct clinical utility based on the 
current medical literature (e.g., in terms of disease prevention or established treatment 
guidelines)” (Berg et al. 2011). 2 In this article we use the term MAG to refer to genes that 
may contain rare genomic variants that confer a high risk of health-related harms for which 
there are interventions available that can potentially prevent or minimize these risks. These 
genes include some of those associated with Lynch syndrome, hereditary breast and ovarian 
cancer, Marfan syndrome, and Long QT syndrome (Evans et al. 2013; Green et al. 2013).
The basic idea behind PGS is simply to take advantage of our new abilities to detect MAGs 
to seek them out directly in patients who have no other known risk factors for the health 
problems these MAGs may flag. With its core idea, however, PGS also inherits a debate—
which has emerged in the clinical WGS/WES context—over the relative role of patients and 
professionals in managing genomic information. This debate can be abstracted into a 
1nb: despite the fact that it is not actually the genes, as loci in the DNA, that are actionable, but only the specific alleles or versions of 
the genes that carry the risk conferring mutations.
2It is important to note that even if some genes are in theory medically actionable, this does not mean that in practice all individuals 
will have access to preventive measures or will even want to undergo these measures due to the nature of the interventions or potential 
side effects.
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conflict between two polarized positions: one that can be characterized as more paternalistic 
and one that is more individualistic. The rationale that drives the paternalistic position in 
many ways is captured by medical geneticists Evans and Berg (2011) when they state that 
“medicine is, to at least some extent, an inherently paternalistic endeavor simply because of 
an inevitable asymmetry in knowledge and because those who practice medicine are pledged 
to avoid causing harm.” This perspective of medicine as inherently paternalistic is rooted in 
a strong sense of the importance of beneficence and non-maleficence when guiding 
clinicians' actions. Consistent with this notion, in the clinical WGS/WES context, those who 
hold the more paternalistic position often argue that health professionals have a duty to 
examine and warn of a risk of potentially preventable harm to patients' health, even if these 
risks were not part of the clinical purpose for ordering genomic sequencing, and their 
examination was not explicitly consented by patients (Green et al. 2013; McGuire et al. 
2013). Furthermore, those who hold this position generally believe that patients cannot be 
expected to assimilate all the relevant information related to the risks and potential benefits 
of analyzing the wide array of secondary MAG risk information available from WGS/WES. 
Therefore—from the perspective of those who support the more paternalistic position—
health professionals performing WGS/WES should analyze secondary target MAGs without 
attempting to involve patients in the decision of which MAGs to analyze. If positive MAG 
findings emerge, clinicians should disclose these to the patient, unless “the patient insists 
that he or she does not want to be informed” and the clinician has ensured “that the patient's 
refusal is informed” (McGuire et al. 2013, 1048).
The second pole in this debate is the individualistic counterpoint, which claims that 
individual patients should have control over what secondary MAG information is analyzed 
by the laboratory, reported to the clinician, and disclosed to patients (Wolf et al. 2013). Its 
argument is that patients have a right to control what medical tests are performed on them, 
rooted in rights to bodily integrity, personal autonomy, and privacy, even when those tests 
are potentially life-saving. In addition, the fiduciary obligations of health professionals to act 
in patients' best interests—including their obligation to prevent harm—are circumscribed by 
other fiduciary obligations such as the duty of loyalty to the interests of the patient. This 
duty involves loyalty to patients' interests in learning health risk information about 
themselves (Lázaro-Muñoz 2014). In this context, informational complexity is not 
presumptively incapacitating; rather, it speaks to the need for and the obligation of expert 
fiduciary agents to digest, translate, and communicate considerations salient for patient 
decision-making.
The clash between these views is an old one for modern medical ethics. In clinical treatment 
contexts the contemporary currents in both ethics and law flow strongly toward the 
individualistic position, which strives to protect patient self-determination. There is less 
literature on the role of patients' preferences in the diagnostic arena. Nonetheless, one of the 
features that makes the debate over MAGs noteworthy is that clinical genetics has 
historically been one of the medical specialties that has stressed the primacy of the patient's 
role in decisions to seek diagnoses and learn health risks (ASHG 1975; NSGC 2006). The 
resurgence of the paternalistic position in this context appears to threaten this tradition.
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We argue that a more nuanced analysis of the challenges of designing and implementing a 
PGS program in practice can help resolve this polarizing debate for PGS. We begin by 
reviewing how the recent debate over the ACMG guidelines for the report of incidental or 
secondary target findings in WGS/WES reveals the tensions at the core of the paternalistic/
individualistic opposition. We then address four sets of considerations that both complicate 
this simple framing in the PGS context and point the way to a resolution of its tension for 
clinical practice.
MAG Management Solution 1.0: Lessons from the ACMG
The generation, use, and disclosure of medically actionable genomic information to research 
participants have been a source of concern and debate for some time (Wolf et al. 2008). 
However, now that WGS/WES is increasingly being used to guide patient care, these 
concerns have percolated into the clinic. The debate generated by the initial ACMG 
recommendations regarding the management of MAGs in the WGS/WES setting (Green et 
al. 2013) is particularly relevant when evaluating PGS because the adoption of these 
recommendations would have created a de facto opportunistic MAG screening program for 
all patients who consented to clinical WGS/WES.
In 2013, the ACMG became worried that “[a]n increasing number of laboratories conduct 
clinical [WGS/WES] and have the potential to seek and report incidental findings, but there 
are no standards to guide their scope of analysis or reporting” (McGuire et al. 2013, 1047). 
The ACMG saw the lack of laboratory reporting standards as a problem because of the risks 
that laboratories might either report clinically meaningless findings or fail to seek and report 
MAGs that could help predict and prevent unsuspected genetic conditions (Green et al. 
2013).
As a result of these concerns, the ACMG solicited and compiled expert opinion on the 
predictive reliability of known MAGs, the severity of their associated health problems, and 
the efficacy of known preventive or treatment interventions, and generated a list of 56 genes 
associated with 24 health conditions. It then released a report in which it recommended that: 
“whenever clinical [WGS/WES] is ordered, … laboratories should seek and report [to the 
ordering clinician] findings from [the 56 MAGs], without reference to patient preferences” 
(Green et al. 2013, 568). Ordering clinicians would then be left to use their clinical judgment 
in conveying this unsought information to patients (Green et al. 2013, 567).
The ACMG's initial solution in a number of ways reflects the paternalistic position on the 
question of how to manage MAGs. The ACMG concluded that the clinicians' and laboratory 
personnel's “fiduciary duty to prevent harm by warning patients and their families” about 
certain actionable health risks “supersedes concerns about patient autonomy” (Green et al. 
2013, 568). The decisive factor for the ACMG in coming to this conclusion was their 
concern that an informed consent process sufficient to allow patients to make informed 
choices about whether to have the ACMG's panel examined would involve “an extensive, 
and possibly overwhelming, amount of genetic counseling” which “might result in deeply 
varying levels of truly informed preference setting” (Green et al. 2013, 568). Another 
important concern was the perception that WGS/WES necessarily generates all the data 
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required to analyze and report the full list of MAGs, leaving laboratory personnel and 
clinicians “sitting on” information “a touch of a button away” that could prevent significant 
harm.
The initial ACMG report elicited a wave of strong reactions from those holding more 
individualistic perspectives. A number of commentators responded to the ACMG's 
recommendation by arguing that it was a threat to patients' autonomy and their “right not to 
know” genetic information. For example, some argued that
mandating that laboratories seek out unrequested information violates patient 
autonomy because patients who are offered testing using genomic sequencing 
methodologies must agree to an analysis of their genome more expansive than the 
clinical question and leaves patients with only an all-or-none decision: agree to 
more expansive analysis or refuse the sequencing (Ross et al. 2013, 368).
Others opposed the ACMG's recommendation from a legal perspective and argued that 
“[i]nformed consent is a well-established legal requirement designed to protect patient 
autonomy—not a matter susceptible to modification by experts in human genetics, no matter 
how learned” and that “in both ethics and law, the clinician has a core fiduciary duty to 
respect the patient's right to decide what testing to undergo and what information to receive” 
(Wolf et al. 2013, 1049). Finally, some argued that “[b]y policy and practice, clinicians or 
other surrogates may only make decisions on behalf of a patient in situations in which (s)he 
is incapable of exercising judgment” (Allyse and Michie 2013). Therefore, “[u]nless 
patients' decision-making capacity is impaired, or their refusal of therapy constitutes a threat 
to public health, their right to refuse [medical interventions] is virtually unlimited” (Burke et 
al. 2013, 856).
Some of the champions of the individualistic position also criticized the ACMG's claim that 
an informed consent process sufficient to allow patients to make choices about the ACMG 
56-gene panel would involve an “extensive and possibly overwhelming, amount of genetic 
counseling” for patients (Green et al. 2013, 568). The counterpoint was that “the report 
marshals no data to support this conclusion and never considers proposals in the literature 
for streamlining the consent process when large numbers of genes are evaluated, such as 
“generic consent,” which would allow the patient to consider categories of genetic tests 
together” (Wolf et al. 2013, 1049).
Solution 1.5: ACMG Complete Opt-Out Recommendation
In 2014, after much debate, the ACMG modified its stance and recommended that patients 
should be allowed to opt out of the report of the entire ACMG 56-gene list (complete opt-
out) (ACMG 2014). This means that, as a part of ordering clinical WGS/WES, a clinician 
would have to offer patients the chance to decline having laboratories analyze and report 
secondary targets. Importantly, the ACMG does not recommend that patients be allowed to 
selectively opt out of the analysis and report of particular MAGs, even though, once having 
been briefed on the whole list, patients may find themselves interested in knowing their risks 
for some but not all of the listed conditions (ACMG 2014; Maron 2014).
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The complete opt-out approach was the ACMG's response to claims that patients' 
preferences should play a more prominent role in the management of secondary target MAG 
information when WGS/WES is performed. To some degree this approach does give 
patients' preferences a more prominent role, but its critics point out that the complete opt-out 
approach still substantially restricts their input compared to other viable options (Lázaro-
Muñoz 2014). For example, under a selective opt-out policy, patients who would not want to 
learn about genetic risks for heart conditions that can cause sudden death due to arrhythmia 
(e.g., Long QT syndrome), could still choose to learn about genetic risks for other heart 
diseases or types of cancer such as hereditary breast and ovarian cancer.
Needless to say, the debate over the management of genomic information in the clinical 
WGS/WES context is not settled. This debate will continue to gain prominence as genomic 
technologies become a part of everyday health care. However, in order to develop evidence-
based as opposed to “extemporaneous” policies (Wilfond and Nolan 1993) for PGS, it is 
critical that we take the lessons learned so far and start looking forward at how the MAG 
management debate can play out in the PGS context.
MAG Management in Preventive Genomic Sequencing
The following analysis focuses on what we see as one of the most likely scenarios for PGS 
aimed at the general population (Evans et al. 2013). However, many of the questions and 
arguments raised here are applicable to other forms of PGS. Initial attempts at PGS for the 
general population will likely target rare genomic conditions that confer a high risk for 
preventable harms. Leading geneticists have argued that attempts to improve population 
health through genomics testing are more likely to be effective if PGS efforts focus on rare 
genomic conditions that confer a high risk of preventable harm, instead of common complex 
diseases for which the contribution of genetics is generally relatively small (Evans et al. 
2013). Furthermore, as we discuss in the Clinical Ethics Considerations section, we expect 
that PGS would likely be implemented in a primary care setting where most other types of 
screening occur.
Because of its likely focus on rare, highly penetrant, and actionable genomic conditions, 
PGS for the general population will probably not employ WGS/WES. WGS/WES generate 
vast amounts of genomic data that increase the cost of genomic testing, but are unrelated to 
the MAG conditions expected to be targeted by PGS programs, or have no known clinical 
validity or utility (Berg et al. 2013). By foregoing WGS/WES in favor of sequencing a 
limited set of genes identified in advance as conferring high risk of preventable harm, PGS 
programs can avoid having to manage large amounts of potential incidental findings. 
However, this does not mean that PGS programs can avoid the MAG management debate. 
Even in this simpler context, the relative role of individual choice and professional judgment 
still needs to be addressed.
Primary care patients are not usually consulted about each measurement performed in a 
standard lipid panel or toxicological screen. One could similarly offer the targeted MAGs as 
an indivisible panel of risk assessments. On the other hand, even individuals believed to be 
at risk for severe, but potentially preventable genetic harms, often decide against learning 
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their risks for numerous personal reasons (Fischer et al. 2012; Sweeny et al. 2014). 
Therefore, even if the genes selected for a PGS program are those considered the most 
highly predictive of disease, and medically actionable, with interventions that individuals are 
likely to access, accept, and adhere to, it is likely that not all individuals will want all of the 
MAGs examined. To accommodate these different interests, one could structure the list of 
targeted MAGs as a menu, so that individuals who decide to participate get the opportunity 
to selectively opt out of the examination and report of the genes they do not wish to have 
examined.
In the PGS context, then, this question arises: Should individuals be given the opportunity to 
selectively opt-out of the sequencing or analysis of specific MAGs (menu approach) or 
should PGS programs be implemented as an all-or-nothing panel approach? At the abstract 
level of the individualistic and paternalistic positions, this question merely yields another 
cycle of polarized debate. The panel approach aligns with the paternalistic position as it 
helps ensure that both clinicians and individuals are adequately prepared to prevent a larger 
range of potential harms that might be discovered and it protects the integrity of the 
professional judgments that endorsed the preventive value of the list. The menu approach 
intuitively aligns with the individualistic position, as it enables individuals to tailor the 
professionals' recommendations to their own values and interests. In actual practice, 
however, a number of other considerations both complicate this simple framing and help 
unlock the stalemate for PGS. These considerations emerge from the perspectives of 1) 
public health; 2) economics and technology; 3) clinical ethics and family studies; and 4) the 
law. We next analyze each of these in turn.
Public Health Considerations
The first question that bears on the debate over whether PGS should be offered as an 
indivisible panel or a menu is whether PGS serves primarily clinical or public health goals. 
PGS programs for genetic variants that confer a high risk for preventable diseases are hailed 
as a way to “realize the promise of public health genomics” (Evans et al. 2013). But this 
foundational question about the purpose of the enterprise still needs to be clarified, and it 
has significant implications for the balance of professional and patient roles.
For a number of reasons, the argument for a panel approach to PGS strengthens if a PGS 
program can be justified as a public health measure. First, the likelihood that a PGS program 
will achieve its public health goals depends heavily on the number of participants and 
genomic risks examined per participant. For example, newborn genetic screening programs 
rely on state laws requiring universal implementation to increase their number of 
participants, and employ periodically expanded panels to increase the range of risks 
assessed. In the case of state-mandated newborn screening programs, the judgment has been 
made that the state's interests in saving individual infants' lives or preventing some health-
related harms outweighs the ordinary rights of parents to make medical risk assessment 
decisions on their children's behalf (PCB 2008). In theory, the more participants and MAGs 
examined, the higher the likelihood that certain health-related harms will be prevented or 
minimized at the population level. Of course, other factors are relevant to the success of a 
public health screening program, including the availability of an effective screening test, the 
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effectiveness of available medical interventions, and the participants' access, uptake, and 
adherence to these interventions (Viera 2011; Harris et al. 2011).
For PGS with adults, a panel approach would also likely examine more risk factors per 
participant because individuals would not have the opportunity to opt out of any MAGs. It is 
not clear how many individuals would refuse to participate in PGS programs if they could 
not opt out of the examination of particular MAG conditions. Nevertheless, in the clinical 
WGS/WES context, some estimate “that most patients will probably not exercise an opt-out 
option” for the examination of MAGs (Evans 2013, 853). To the degree that this is also the 
case in the PGS context, a panel approach would seem better designed to promote PGS's 
public health goals.
Second, when the public's health is at stake, individuals' ordinary freedoms can sometimes 
be curtailed. Compulsory vaccinations, routinized newborn screening, and heavy-handed 
health warnings are socially tolerated in our pursuit of collective public health goals, even 
where they distort the ideals of mutual respect and patient empowerment in the clinical 
setting. If PGS were primarily intended to achieve important public health goals, such as 
preventing a socially destabilizing rise in population morbidity or mortality (as from an 
infectious disease epidemic or the snow-balling costs of smoking-related cancers), then an 
all-or-nothing panel approach could be justified even in the face of individualistic objections 
to the panel approach's constraints on autonomy. This justification would be even more 
persuasive if those being screened do not have the capacity to make well-informed decisions 
themselves or the conditions screened required urgent care, as is the case with newborn 
screening.
The public health rationale for PGS programs is difficult to sustain, however. PGS programs 
would likely screen for MAGs that confer a high risk for severe, but potentially preventable 
diseases (Evans et al. 2013). Yet only about 0.5% - 1.0% of the population is expected to 
have such MAG variants (Evans et al. 2013). In addition to being rare, even high-risk MAG 
variants account for a relatively small proportion of the incidence of the disease with which 
they are associated. For example, “[t]ogether, BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations account for 
about … 5 to 10 percent of all breast cancers … [and] around 15 percent of ovarian cancers” 
(National Cancer Institute 2014). Lynch Syndrome, considered by some to be one of the 
strongest candidates for PGS because of the penetrance of its potentially harmful variants, 
its prevalence, and the availability of medical interventions, only “accounts for 
approximately 1% - 3% of colon cancers, and 0.8% - 1.4% of endometrial cancers” (Evans 
and Berg 2011; Evans et al. 2013; Kohlmann and Gruber 2014). This means that even if a 
PGS program would help prevent or minimize health harms in the 0.5% - 1.0% of the 
population who unknowingly carry potentially harmful MAG variants, it would not have a 
significant public health impact in terms of decreasing the prevalence of any of the 
conditions examined.
Moreover, since the population incidence of MAG-related diseases is not known to be 
increasing in any socially destabilizing ways, it is not clear that the health benefits promised 
by PGS would merit an appeal to public health considerations in defending an all-or-nothing 
panel approach to MAG management. PGS programs would detect genetic variants that 
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confer high risk for severe conditions, but unlike some of the conditions that are part of 
newborn screening programs, MAG findings generally do not require urgent care, which 
further undermines the argument for PGS as a public health program.
In the absence of a compelling public health rationale for PGS, the public welfare 
justification for limiting individual participation to a full panel evaporates. Furthermore, 
research suggests that patients' principal motivations for seeking genetic testing are largely 
clinical: perceived personal risk of developing a heritable disorder, disease-specific worry, 
family history of a heritable disorder, and personal history of a particular disorder (Sweeny 
et al. 2014). This suggests that PGS may make more sense as a clinical tool aimed at 
resolving individual patient anxieties about their possible risks for specific MAGs targeted 
by the PGS program. If so, it will important not to confuse the program's goals by using 
language that assumes a public health mission, and to assess the limits of patient control 
within the context of considerations relevant to the clinical care of patients rather than the 
protection of population health.
Cost and Technical Considerations
Whether PGS is offered as a public health intervention or a personal risk-assessment service, 
the design of a successful PGS program still faces important practical constraints. Cost is 
one of the factors that will affect access to PGS programs regardless of whether preventive 
MAG sequencing is covered by government programs, insurance companies, individuals or 
a combination of these. Therefore, it is important to determine how taking a panel or menu 
approach to PGS can affect the cost of sequencing. An important benefit of targeted 
sequencing compared to WGS or WES is its reduced cost. For example, targeted sequencing 
of a set of 28 cancer-related genes costs approximately $4,250 (Ambry Genetics 2014) while 
WES and WGS cost approximately $5,800 (Ambry Genetics 2014) and $10,000 (NHGRI 
2014), respectively.
Both panel-based and menu-based PGS approaches would sequence a targeted set of MAGs. 
One method for implementing a menu-based PGS would be to give individuals the 
opportunity to opt out of the sequencing of some of the genes that are part of the PGS 
program (selective sequencing). Selective sequencing would allow individuals to decide that 
they do not want the laboratory to generate the raw genomic data for some of the loci in the 
PGS program. Selective sequencing, however, would require laboratories to develop 
customized sequencing libraries and assays for each individual, depending on the 
combination of genes that the patient wants sequenced. This would undercut the economies 
of scale that could be achieved by a panel-based PGS approach that uses the same genetic 
sequencing assay for every patient. Therefore, it could greatly increase cost and limit access 
to PGS.
Another alternative for a menu-based PGS program would be a selective analysis approach. 
Under this approach, the laboratory would generate the raw genomic data (DNA sequence) 
for all of the genes that are part of the PGS program, but individuals would get the 
opportunity to opt out of the analysis of the raw data for those MAG conditions they do not 
want to learn about or have reported to their clinician. The menu-based selective analysis 
approach would offer significant savings over the selective sequencing approach because, as 
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with the panel-based PGS approach, laboratories could use the same sequencing assay for 
every individual. A selective analysis approach would only require laboratories to have the 
bioinformatics capability to specify those genes they want to analyze from the PGS assay. 
This means that from a financial perspective both the panel approach and the menu-based 
selective analysis approach present similar advantages over WGS/WES or a menu-based 
selective sequencing approach to PGS.
Clinical Ethics Considerations
Clinical ethics considerations permeate almost every aspect of the management of MAG 
information in genomic testing, but many have been obscured by the reductive paternalistic/
individualistic framing of the debate to date. Four sets of neglected considerations seem 
particularly relevant to adjudicating the tension between professional and patient decision-
making in the PGS context: more nuanced views of the “best interests” protected by the 
therapeutic relationship, richer understandings of personal autonomy, the salience of family 
interests, and debates over a “right not to know.”
Best Interests of the Patient—Whether PGS is justified as a public health intervention 
or a personal risk assessment service, one of the most likely venues for such a program 
would be the primary care setting. Primary care clinicians are generally the first contact for 
individuals seeking medical services and they are familiar with conducting preventive 
screening, even if the novelty and complexity of PGS may require training. On the other 
hand, making primary care clinicians the gatekeepers to this service would bring their own 
professional ethos and ethics into play, which also has implications for whether the service 
is offered as a panel or a menu.
Clinicians have a professional fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of their patients 
(American Medical Association 2001). Determining what this duty means for the panel 
versus menu debate depends on how the “best interest” of an individual is defined. If the 
best interest of an individual is limited to a person's professionally-defined medical best 
interest, then the panel approach would probably promote the individual's best interest more 
than a menu approach. A panel approach would ensure the detection of a greater number of 
deleterious MAG variants, and as illustrated by the ACMG report, there seems to be a 
consensus in the field of medical genetics that reporting deleterious MAG variants to 
ordering clinicians “would likely have medical benefit for the patients and their families” 
(Green et al. 2013, 567).
However, research suggests that individuals' decisions about the examination of genetic 
information involve not just medical considerations but also their values and their emotional, 
economic, social, and familial interests (Oosterwijk et al. 2014; Sweeny et al. 2014; Van 
Riper 2010). If the best interest of an individual is defined more broadly to integrate these 
other relevant interests, then clinicians need to know how patients balance those interests for 
themselves in order to fulfill their fiduciary duty. The menu approach would meet this need 
better, by more accurately reflecting and promoting individuals' judgments of their own 
interests. It is important to note that the menu approach would still integrate clinicians' input 
about individuals' best medical interests in two significant ways: 1) clinicians would be 
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involved in determining which MAGs should be tested as part of the PGS program and; 2) 
clinicians could provide their professional judgment at the clinic when individuals are 
invited to participate in the program.
Personal Autonomy—A cornerstone moral commitment of contemporary clinical ethics 
is the requirement to respect patients as persons. This is usually interpreted in terms of 
respecting patients' personal autonomy and their rights to make important decisions about 
their own health care, even when such decisions conflict with a clinician's own professional 
views. However, a number of important considerations can shape the limits of respect for 
personal autonomy in the PGS context.
Some argue that “autonomy is not simply a matter of acting on one's preferences, even one's 
informed preferences,” but that there must be sufficient value in the choices offered (Vayena 
and Tasioulas 2013, 868). These commentators argue, for example, that the ACMG's 56-
lociextended analysis and report recommendation enhances patient autonomy because the 
report would generate “a fuller menu of worthwhile options” that are “valuable in enabling 
the pursuit of improved health outcomes for the patients[,]….the patients' relatives and serve 
the common good of promoting a healthy society” (Vayena and Tasioulas 2013, 868).
Translated to the PGS context, this logic would suggest that a panel approach would 
enhance individual autonomy because it would ensure examination of all MAGs that are part 
of the PGS program and thus would provide “worthwhile options” (e.g., medical 
interventions, further testing, disclosure to relatives) to those individuals who are found to 
have any potentially harmful MAG mutations. The problem with this approach is that it 
presumes—for all individuals—that having a choice about which genes to examine within a 
PGS program is not a worthwhile option. However, this presumption ignores the reality that 
numerous personal and familial, emotional, economic, and medical interests come into play 
when an individual is deciding whether to know or not know a potential genomic risk. The 
ability to take such factors into account in order to decide which MAG conditions should be 
examined seems itself to be a worthwhile option. If that is the case, then the menu approach, 
by giving individuals that opportunity, shows greater respect for autonomy.
An essential precondition to the exercise of autonomy in medical decision-making is that 
individuals understand the options presented. In order to allow individuals to understand 
their options in a PGS program there must be adequate mechanisms and resources in place 
(e.g., genetic counseling, decision aids, time) to deliver risks and benefits information about 
MAG testing. Many worry about the possibility of communicating the information 
necessary to allow for meaningful understanding of the risks and benefits of opting out of 
the examination of certain MAG conditions (Green et al. 2013; McGuire et al., 2013). Some 
believe that the consequences of opting out can be so complex and abstract that opt-out 
alternatives would simply give individuals “an illusory degree of autonomy” which could 
“come back to haunt them with highly problematic consequences” (Evans 2013, 853).
The complexity of genomic information and the consequences of opting out are an 
undeniable challenge for the menu approach. However, this is an equal challenge for the 
panel approach. Under a panel approach, individuals may still refuse to participate in the 
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PGS program, thereby incurring the same kind of opportunity cost (e.g., not detecting a 
potentially harmful MAG variant) as individuals who selectively opt out of some of the 
MAGs on a menu.
Limiting individuals' choices by using a panel approach does not reduce the amount of 
information required to inform a decision about whether to participate in a PGS program. 
Regardless of whether they are being asked to consent to a panel or choose from a menu, 
individuals still need to understand the risks and benefits of the components (e.g., MAG 
conditions or categories of MAG conditions) of the PGS program in order to make an 
informed decision about their participation. Given this necessity, the panel and menu 
approaches would impose similar information communication burdens for clinicians. 
Because PGS will examine only a limited number of MAG conditions, both panel and menu 
approaches should create fewer communication challenges for clinicians compared to WGS/
WES. Nevertheless, whichever approach is ultimately chosen, developing more efficient and 
effective ways of delivering genomic information in a comprehensible manner should 
remain a high priority.
Familial Interests—One of the most important constraints on patient self-interest in the 
PGS setting is the fact that the individual being sequenced is not the only person whose 
interests are affected by the exercise (Rhodes 1998). In the course of providing individuals 
with information about the MAGs they carry, a PGS program will also generate genetic risk 
information that will have implications for individuals' families. By ensuring that 
participants get all MAGs examined, the panel approach increases the chances that 
information generated on all the variants will be disclosed to other family members. This 
could contribute to one or more family members living longer, healthier lives, and making 
better-informed reproductive decisions.
However, the panel approach also presents some challenges. For example, simply because 
more MAG information will be generated, there is a marginally greater chance of family 
tensions developing due to secrecy, misunderstandings, communication problems, feelings 
of guilt and shame, and blaming (Rowland and Metcalf 2013; Van Riper 2005, 2010; Van 
Riper and Gallo 2006; Wisemann et al. 2010). In addition, while the panel approach 
increases the chances that relatives will learn about potential genomic risks, it also increases 
the chances of overtesting and overtreating them. This is a particularly difficult problem in 
PGS programs because little is known about the penetrance of MAG deleterious mutations 
in individuals with no symptoms or family history of disease (Green et al. 2013; Moyer et al. 
2014).
On the other hand, the menu approach would allow individuals to make a choice about 
which MAG conditions to examine based on the individual's and their family's best 
emotional, economic, and medical interests. This advantage is limited by the fact that 
individuals' judgments of what is in their best interest may not always align with the best 
interests of their relatives. But the menu approach fits closely with the model of client-
centered, non-directive genetic counseling that has come to characterize clinical geneticists' 
work with families since the 1950's (Stern 2012). That model explicitly gives moral priority 
to the interests of individuals and couples in the dissemination and use of genetic 
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information. This priority represents a reaction to the emphasis given to the interests of 
future generations, communities and populations during the eugenics movements of the first 
part of the twentieth century (Paul 1995). The invasions of personal reproductive and 
informational privacy made in the name of public health by eugenically motivated programs 
continue to cast a shadow over interventions that might limit individual choices concerning 
the discovery and dissemination of genetic information (Parker 2012).
Right Not to Know—One echo of the concern with keeping genetic decision-making in 
the hands of individuals is the notion of a “right not to know”. Multiple authors have 
appealed to respect for autonomy as the basis for rights to know or not to know genetic 
information (Andorno 2004; Chadwick 2009). Consistent with this view, Article 5(c) of 
UNESCO's Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights states that “[t]he right of 
each individual to decide whether or not to be informed of the results of genetic examination 
and the resulting consequences should be respected” (UNESCO 1997). Others have recently 
argued for the right not to know genomic information in the WGS/WES context not only as 
a matter of respect for individual autonomy, but also as a matter of privacy, and as an aspect 
of the clinician's fiduciary duty (Laurie 2014; Lázaro-Muñoz 2014; Wolf et al. 2013). The 
existence of rights to know and not to know genetic information appears to support a menu 
approach because it would be more sensitive to individual patient preferences to receive or 
avoid knowledge about particular MAGs.
On the other hand, some are skeptical about a right not to know, and argue that refusing 
useful medical information is not a rational choice and thus it is not an autonomous act for 
which a right should be recognized (Ost 1984). Meanwhile, others argue that autonomy 
cannot be the basis of a right not to know genetic information because if one decides not to 
know relevant genetic information, one chooses “to leave things to chance” and “follow a 
path without autonomy”(Rhodes 1998, 18). Furthermore, some argue that even if rights not 
to know exist, they lack parity with the right to know, and are easily outweighed by other 
relevant considerations (Harris and Keywood 2001).
In the WGS/WES context, supporters of panel-based approaches have argued that “[t]he 
right not to know is ethically controversial, and most of the relevant literature relates to 
findings for which no clearly beneficial interventions are available” (McGuire et al. 2013). 
Others argue that the right not to know MAG information in genomic medicine should be 
limited to exceptional situations where individuals have “a valid reason why they would not 
want to take clinical action,” such as “previously diagnosed terminal illnesses … or people 
with religious objections to certain kinds of treatment” (Berkman and Hull 2014).
To the degree that a moral right not to know is limited or not recognized in genomic 
medicine, a panel approach becomes more ethically acceptable. However, if—as has been 
the tradition in clinical genetics—a broad ethical right not to know is recognized, a menu 
approach would be more protective of this right because individuals could refuse the 
analysis and report of particular MAGs before consenting to PGS. A panel approach would 
be more problematic for the right not to know. If the laboratory reports MAG mutations to 
the ordering clinician, and the patient declines to receive that information, the clinician will 
be in the difficult professional position of having actionable genomic risk information but 
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being ethically bound not to disclose it to the individual or the individual's relatives who 
might also be at risk. Furthermore, even if the clinician does not disclose these results 
directly to the patient, they may reside in the individual's medical record because the 
laboratory or clinician may be obliged to place them there, making them necessarily 
available to others involved in treatment or payment, and increasing the chances that the 
individual could inadvertently learn about them in the future.
Legal Considerations
In addition to medical ethics considerations, there are a number of legal considerations in 
play when determining whether a PGS program should use a panel or a menu approach. 
Traditionally, the American legal system has been very protective of autonomy in the 
medical context and of patients' right to control what should be done with their bodies 
(Schloendorff v. Soc'y N.Y. Hosp. 1914). This is reflected in the doctrine of informed 
consent and the right to refuse treatment, even when potentially life-saving (Cruzan v. Mo. 
Dep't of Health 1990).
Disclosure Component of Informed Consent—Informed consent requires disclosure 
of what is to be done and the attendant risks and benefits. Both the panel and menu 
approaches can meet the disclosure component of informed consent by requiring appropriate 
pre-PGS disclosures. The specifics of these disclosures will depend on the informed consent 
legal standard of the state in which the PGS program will be implemented. There are two 
principal informed consent standards in the United States: the reasonable physician standard 
and the reasonable patient standard (Studdert et al. 2007). Under the reasonable physician 
standard, also known as the professional standard, clinicians are only required to disclose the 
risks and benefits that are customarily disclosed by prudent clinicians under similar 
circumstances (Culbertson v. Mernitz 1992). Under the reasonable patient standard, 
necessary disclosures depend on a determination of what a reasonable patient would 
consider material to decide whether to participate in a PGS program (Canterbury v. Spence 
1972). A risk is considered material “when a reasonable person, in what the physician 
knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to 
the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to” participate in the PGS program 
(Canterbury v. Spence 1972, 787).
Each informed consent legal standard has its virtues and its problems. However, the 
differences between the two standards are largely irrelevant to deciding between the panel 
and menu approaches. Regardless of which standard applies in a given state, the panel and 
menu approaches will require similar disclosures as they entail the potential examination of 
the same health information using similar methods.
Refusal Component of Informed Consent—Informed consent implies that the 
individual must freely consent in advance to a medical intervention; its negative logical 
corollary is that the individual is equally free to refuse (Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health 1990, 
270). It is widely recognized that the doctrine of informed consent applies to medical 
examinations, thus clinicians routinely obtain informed consent before ordering genetic 
tests. The application of the informed consent doctrine to genetic testing implies that 
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individuals have a legal right to refuse genetic tests. However, it is unclear at this point 
whether the law will recognize that the right to refuse medical interventions grants patients 
the right to selectively opt out of the examination of specific components of genomic tests. 
Nevertheless, if there are practical ways of protecting an individual's right to refuse the 
examination of specific medical information, it would seem unreasonable to deny patients 
the opportunity to freely exercise their right of refusal in the genomic testing context.
While the panel and menu approaches can both satisfy the disclosure element of informed 
consent, they do not offer the same kind of protection for the refusal component of the 
doctrine of informed consent. With a panel-based approach to PGS, the individual can, of 
course, refuse the proffered test entirely. However, the exercise of that right to refuse is 
burdened, because refusing the test means forgoing all of the potential benefits of examining 
even some of the MAGs on the panel. This burden may be unjustifiable because there are 
alternatives, such as the menu-based selective analysis approach, that are practical and 
provide more protection for the right to refuse medical examinations. Finally, some may 
argue that a panel approach does not impose an unjustifiable burden because individuals 
could always decide to refuse the entire panel and get more specific genomic tests through 
other means. However, depending on how many MAG conditions an individual would like 
examined, specific genetic tests could be prohibitively expensive, especially for those with 
limited economic resources.
Genetic Discrimination—The inclusion of deleterious MAG variants in the medical 
record can increase the chances that an individual will face genetic discrimination of some 
kind. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 and most relevant state 
statutes, offer little protection against genetic discrimination in life, disability, and long-term 
care insurance, or against many other kinds of discriminatory uses of genetic information 
(Rothstein 2009, 2012). Ideally, patients would get the opportunity to decide whether they 
would like the information included in their medical record, but that is probably not going to 
be the case. Clinicians' determinations about what to include in a medical record are often 
dependent on institutional policies, legal concerns, and what clinicians' perceive to be their 
professional duties. For example, if the laboratory reports any deleterious MAG variants, 
clinicians will likely include all of them in the medical record because they are pertinent 
findings about an individual's health that can impact patient care in the future. Furthermore, 
clinicians will likely document MAG findings in the medical record to protect themselves 
against legal claims regarding their management of the patient. For example, a finding of a 
potentially harmful variant that indicates an increased risk for familial hypercholesterolemia 
could provide evidence of why a clinician prescribed stat in therapy if a patient were to file a 
malpractice claim against the clinician for adverse effects related to the medication 
(Youngblom and Knowles 2014).
This is an important issue for the panel versus menu debate because the panel approach 
would not allow people to balance the potential benefits of screening for particular MAGs 
against the potential risks of having this information in their medical record. Conversely, a 
menu approach would allow individuals to opt out of the examination of particular MAGs 
that they judge not to be worth the risks of testing, including potential genetic 
discrimination.
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Genomic testing technologies may have significant if yet-unrealized potential for improving 
human health. The realization of this promise will likely involve screening for highly 
penetrable genes that confer significant risk of serious health problems that may be 
ameliorated by medical intervention. The decision about which medically actionable 
genomic risks an individual would like examined is deeply personal because the results can 
have a dramatic impact on the lives of the individuals being tested and their relatives. These 
effects can vary depending on an individual's life experiences, stage in life, familial 
obligations, emotional coping mechanisms, and socioeconomic resources, among other 
things.
The use of genomic testing technologies in research and the clinic has led to important 
debates about the role of professional judgment versus individual preference in the 
management of MAGs. Two main camps have emerged in this debate, the paternalistic and 
individualistic positions. The paternalistic position, using beneficence arguments, contends 
that professional judgment should primarily guide determinations about how MAG data is 
managed. On the other side, supporters of the individualistic position emphasize the 
importance of respect for autonomy and believe that individuals should have as much 
control as possible when managing their MAG information.
We have taken this debate to the PGS arena, focusing in particular on the choice between 
panel-based and menu-based approaches to PGS in clinical care. In doing so, we have 
shown that more granular analysis of the complex issues underlying this choice belie the 
simplistic opposition of paternalism and individualism that has characterized the literature to 
date. A robust public health rationale might offer the strongest support for a panel approach, 
but it is lacking. On the other side, a number of ethical, clinical, practical, familial, and legal 
considerations favor the menu approach. The tradition of respect for self-determination that 
is deeply embedded in the American legal system and the theory and practice of bioethics is 
a common thread in these considerations, but it is by no means the only significant issue. An 
analysis of how to accurately frame the objectives of PGS, how to facilitate access to PGS as 
a clinical tool for health management, what it means to act in participants' best interests, and 
how to promote meaningful participant understanding of the risks and benefits also play a 
key role.
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